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UN!V.  OF  FL  Lli. 
npcyM£NTS  PEP.: 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION 

REPORT  OF  THE  DIRECTOR  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY  IN  RE 
INVESTIGATION  OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE 
PENNSYLVANIA  RAILROAD  AT  ALTOONA,  PA,  ON  NOVEMBER  29, 
1925 

December  28,  1925. 
To  the  Commission  : 

On  November  29,  1925,  there  was  a  derailment  of  a  freight  train 
on  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  at  Altoona,  Pa.,  which  resulted  in 
the  death  of  two  employees  and  the  injury  of  one  employee. 

LOCATION  AND  METHOD  OF  OPERATION 

This  accident  occurred  on  that  part  of  the  Pittsburgh  Division 
extending  between  Pittsburgh  and  Altoona,  Pa.,  a  distance  of  113.8 
miles.  In  the  vicinity  of  the  point  of  accident  this  is  a  four-track 
line  over  which  trains  are  operated  by  time-table,  train  orders,  and 
an  automatic  block-signal  system.  The  tracks  are  numbered  from 
north  to  south  as  follows:  4,  3,  2,  and  1;  the  train  involved  started 
to  run  away  while  on  track  1,  was  diverted  to  track  A,  which 
parallels  track  1  on  the  south,  at  BO  block  station,  at  which  point 
one  pair  of  wheels  was  derailed,  and  was  running  on  this  track 
when  it  was  entirely  derailed  nearly  opposite  JK  block  station,  ap- 
proximately 1  mile  distant.  Approaching  JK  block  station  from 
the  west  the  track  is  tangent  for  a  distance  of  5,900  feet,  while  the 
grade  for  the'  distance  of  nearly  12  miles  between  Gallitzin  and 
Altoona  is  descending  for  eastbound  trains,  the  greater  part  of  this 
grade  being  between  1.5  and  2  per  cent. 

The  weather  was  clear  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  which  occurred 
at  7.46  a.  m. 

DESCRIPTION 

Eastbound  freight  train  symbol  VL-4  consisted  of  58  cars  and  a 
caboose,  hauled  by  engine  1282,  and  was  in  charge  of  Conductor 
Perry  and  Engineman  Scheline.  It  departed  from  Sharpsburg, 
Pa.,  on  the  Conemaugh  Division,  at  5.45  p.  m.,  November  28,  and 
made  several  stops  en  route,  including  one  at  Conemaugh,  on  the 
Pittsburgh  Division.  It  left  Conemaugh  at  1.30  a.  m.,  assisted  by 
helper  engine  4587,  started  down  the  grade  at  Gallitzin,  at  which 

77059—26 


1  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION 

point  the  helper  engine  was  cut  off,  and  had  nearly  reached  GY 
block  station,  3.3  miles  from  Altoona,  when  the  train  was  stalled 
by  an  application  of  the  brakes  due  to  some  cause  which  was  not 
determined.  After  a  delay  at  this  point  of  30  or  35  minutes  the 
train  proceeded,  passed  GY  block  station  according  to  the  train 
sheet  at  7.41  a.  m.,  got  beyond  control  of  its  crew  and  ran  away, 
being  derailed  at  Altoona  while  traveling  at  a  speed  estimated  to 
have  been  about  60  miles  an  hour. 

The  first  mark  of  derailment  was  at  a  frog  located  just  west  of 
BO  block  station,  and  there  were  wheel-flange  marks  on  the  outside 
of  the  left  rail  and  on  the  inside  of  the  right  rail,  about  4  or  5 
inches  from  the  base  of  the  rail,  extending  from  this  point  to  the 
point  where  the  final  derailment  occurred.  The  engine  and  39  cars 
were  derailed,  the  majority  of  the  cars  being  demolished.  The 
employees  killed  were  the  engineman  and  fireman. 

SUMMARY  OF  EVIDENCE 

Conductor  Perry  said  his  train,  which  was  what  is  known  as  a 
relay  train,  was  received  at  Sharpsburg  from  the  west,  and  that,  as 
is  customary  with  such  trains,  he  received  from  the  clerk  the  mani- 
fests and  also  a  slip  showing  the  number  of  cars  in  the  train  and  the 
fact  that  the  air  brakes  were  100  per  cent  operative,  and  he  said  he 
gave  the  original  copy  of  this  air-brake  report  to  the  engineman. 
No  terminal  tests  are  made  with  these  relayed  trains  before  depart- 
ing, the  instructions  being  to  make  a  road  test,  which  merely  shows 
that  the  air  is  coupled  through  to  the  caboose.  At  Conemaugh, 
about  23  miles  from  Gallitzin,  the  engine  was  cut  off  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  on  coal  and  cleaning  the  fire,  another  road  test  of  the  air 
brakes  being  made  when  the  engine  was  recoupled.  When  the  train 
reached  Cresson  near  the  summit  of  the  ascending  grade  approach- 
ing Gallitzin,  he  left  the  caboose  and  went  out  on  top  of  the  train, 
and  he  said  that  prior  to  leaving  the  caboose  he  noted  that  the  brake- 
pipe  pressure  was  then  between  65  and  70  pounds.  Conductor  Perry 
began  turning  up  the  retaining  valves  and  he  said  that  when  the 
train  started  down  the  grade  extending  from  Gallitzin  to  Altoona 
all  the  retaining  valves  on  the  train  were  turned  up  with  the  excep- 
tion of  four  on  the  rear  end  of  the  train,  and  that  in  addition  hand 
brakes  were  applied  on  six  cars  at  the  head  end  of  the  train.  He 
stated  the  number  of  hand  brakes  to  be  applied  is  left  to  the  judg- 
ment of  conductors,  and  when  at  Conemaugh  he  had  told  the  head 
brakeman  how  many  hand  bakes  to  apply  on  the  head  end  of  the 
train.  It  further  appeared  from  Conductor  Perry's  statements  that 
before  starting  down  the  grade  east  of  Gallitzin  a  brake-pipe  pres- 
sure of  85  pounds  is  required  on  the  head  end  of  the  train,  with  not 


ACCIDENT   AT  AT/TOONA,    PA.  3 

less  than  75  pounds  on  the  rear  end;  if  there  is  a  pressure  of  less 
than  75  pounds  on  the  rear  end  the  engineman  of  the  helper  engine 
is  supposed  to  sound  a  stop  signal  before  cutting  off  from  the 
(rain  at  that  point.  When  the  train  passed  AR  block  station 
practically  at  the  summit  of  the  grade,  Conductor  Perry  heard  a 
whistle  signal,  which  he  thought  was  sounded  by  the  engineman  of 
1  he  helper  engine,  this  signal  indicating  that  it  was  all  right  for  the 
train  to  proceed,  and  lie  said  he  transmitted  a  proceed  signal  to  the 
engineman. 

No  trouble  was  experienced  in  handling  the  train  down  the  grade 
at  a  moderate  rate  of  speed,  and  from  his  place  in  about  the  middle 
of  the  train  he  had  not  noticed  any  heavy  applications  of  the  brakes 
just  before  the  train  stalled,  a  short  distance  west  of  GY  block 
station,  although  prior  to  this  time  he  had  noticed  that  the  brakes- 
were  sticking  on  about  six  cars.  After  the  train  had  stalled  Con- 
ductor Perry  turned  down  some  of  the  retaining  valves  and  found 
five  or  six  which  would  not  release.  He  then  turned  up  the  retainers 
again  and  bled  the  air  from  some  of  the  auxiliary  reservoirs,  after 
which  he  went  to  a  telephone  for  the  purpose  of  notifying  the  oper- 
ator that  his  train  had  stopped  and  giving  the  operator  information 
concerning  the  number  of  hours  his  crew  had  been  on  duty,  after 
which  he  started  ahead  and  met  the  head  brakeman,  who  said  he 
had  been  arguing  with  the  engineman  about  overcharging  the  train 
line,  the  engineman  claiming  that  the  train  line  had  not  been  over- 
charged. He  did  not,  however,  go  up  to  the  head  end  of  the  train 
and  talk  with  the  engineman  for  the  purpose  of  finding  out  what 
had  caused  the  train  to  stall,  having  met  the  brakeman  at  a  point 
about  25  car  lengths  from  the  engine;  and  he  said  that  while  talk- 
ing with  the  brakeman  the  engineman  took  the  slack  three  or  four 
times,  finally  succeeding  in  starting  the  train,  although  the  brakes 
still  were  sticking  to  some  extent.  Conductor  Perry  did  not  notice 
any  application  of  the  air  brakes  after  the  train  started,  and  as  it 
passed  GY  block  station,  at  about  which  time  he  heard  the  engine- 
man  sound  a  whistle  signal  calling  for  hand  brakes,  he  applied  the 
hand  brakes  on  two  cars  and  shortly  afterwards  was  able  to  apply 
the  brakes  on  three  more  cars:  and  he  said  that  while  he  did  not 
know  what  was  wrong  he  supposed  at  the  time  that  the  pumps  on 
the  engine  were  out  of  order.  He  estimated  the  speed  of  the  train 
when  passing  BO  block  station  to  have  been  about  30  or  35  miles 
an  hour  and  said  he  remained  on  the  train,  near  the  rear  end,  until 
it  was  derailed  after  the  engine  had  passed  JK  block  station.  Con- 
ductor Perry  further  stated  that  when  his  train  stalled  west  of  GY 
block  station  he  did  not  think  that  there  was  anything  wrong  other 
than  the  overcharging  of  the  train  line;  although  required  when 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

a  train  has  stopped  on  the  grade  for  some  unknown  reason  to  turn 
down  all  retaining  valves  and  make  a  road  test,  yet  such  a  test  was 
not  made  in  this  case. 

Head  Brakeman  Pincuspy  said  he  left  the  engine  at  Cresson,  pre- 
vious to  which  the  engineman  had  had  no  difficulty  with  the  air 
brakes,  and  started  back  over  the  train,  turning  up  the  retaining 
valves  on  the  first  20  or  22  cars,  and  that  when  the  train  finally 
stalled  west  of  GY  block  station  he  had  also  applied  the  hand  brakes 
on  five  cars  at  the  head  end  of  the  train;  he  said  that  the  train 
stalled  with  the  engine  working  steam  and  the  air  brakes  applied  in 
emergency.  After  the  train  stopped  he  went  over  the  cars  toward 
the  head  end  of  the  train,  turning  down  the  retaining  valves  and 
then  turning  them  up  again:  he  said  he  did  not  get  any  blow  when 
he  turned  them  down  while  the  pistons  remained  out,  causing  him 
to  think  that  the  train  line  was  overcharged,  and  when  he  reached  the 
head  end  of  the  train  he  began  bleeding  the  auxiliaries,  not  drain- 
ing them,  but,  according  to  his  statements,  taking  some  of  the  strain 
off  the  brake  shoes.  In  doing  this,  at  which  time  the  retaining  valves 
were  in  the  holding  position,  he  did  not  bleed  the  auxiliaries  on  all 
the  cars  but  would  occasionally  skip  one  or  two  cars,  and  he  estimated 
that  he  opened  about  12  or  15  bleed  cocks;  the  pistons,  however, 
would  not  release  after  this  had  been  done.  It  also  appeared  from 
his  statements  that  another  reduction  was  made  and  that  the  brakes 
again  applied  in  emergency.  After  bleeding  the  auxiliaries  Head 
Brakeman  Pincuspy  returned  to  the  engine  and  had  an  argument 
with  the  engineman,  who  had  gotten  off  the  engine  and  had  started 
back  along  the  train  looking  at  the  bleed  cocks;  he  said  this  argu- 
ment was  as  to  reasons  for  the  stalling  of  the  train,  that  he  told  the 
engineman  he  must  have  overcharged  the  train  line  while  the  engine- 
man  said  the  trouble  was  located  on  the  train  and  not  on  the  engine. 
Brakeman  Pincuspy  said  that  when  a  train  stops  for  unknown  rea- 
sons the  crew  is  supposed  to  locate  the  trouble,  make  a  road  test  to 
see  that  the  air  is  working  through  the  train,  and  then  wait  until 
the  air  pressure  is  restored  before  proceeding.  This  procedure  was 
not  followed,  however,  in  this  case.  According  to  his  statements,  the 
flagman  was  recalled  by  the  engineman,  a  proceed  signal  was  given 
by  the  conductor,  and  the  train  was  started  with  the  brakes  sticking 
throughout  the  train.  Although  the  speed  began  to  increase,  yet  he 
did  not  realize  that  the  train  was  out  of  the  control  of  the  engine- 
man  until  he  saw  the  fireman  on  top  of  the  first  car  in  the  train  and 
at  about  the  same  time  he  heard  the  engineman  calling  for  hand 
brakes,  this  being  after  the  train  had  passed  GY  block  station,  and 
he  said  he  then  began  applying  hand  brakes,  working  toward  the 
rear  end  of  the  train,  and  had  succeeded  in  setting  the  brakes  on  six 


ACCIDENT  AT   ALTOONA,   PA.  5 

cars.  He  estimated  the  speed  of  the  train  to  have  been  about  75  or 
SO  miles  an  hour  immediately  prior  to  the  time  the  derailment 
occurred  near  ,)K  block  station.  Head  Brakemati  Pincuspy  further 
stated  thai  while  the  train  was  standing  at  the  point  where  it  had 
stalled  lie  did  not  notice  any  closed  angle  cocks  or  any  leaks  in  the 
train  line,  and  he  was  unable  to  offer  any  explanation  as  to  why  the 
train  got  beyond  control  after  passing  GY  block  station. 

The  statements  of  Flagman  St  raver  concerning  the  movements 
of  his  train  prior  to  the  time  it  reached  Gallitzin  brought  out  noth- 
ing additional  of  importance.  He  said  the  pressure  according  to 
the  caboose  gauge  was  about  70  pounds  when  the  helper  engine  was 
cut  off  at  Gallitzin  and  that  the  engineman  of  the  helper  engine 
whistled  off  at  that  time;  he  afterwards  qualified  this  statement, 
however,  to  the  extent  of  saying  that  he  was  busy  with  other  duties 
and  did  not  notice  whether  the  engineman  of  the  helper  engine 
whistled  for  the  train  to  be  stopped  or  for  it  to  proceed.  He  said 
the  brakes  were  working  properly  from  Gallitzin  to  the  point 
where  the  train  stalled  and  that  he  then  went  back  to  protect  his 
train.  When  recalled  he  returned  to  the  caboose  and  glanced  at  the 
gauge,  but  he  said  he  was  unable  to  say  whether  or  not  it  indicated 
there  was  any  brake-pipe  pressure.  He  then  rode  in  his  usual  posi- 
tion, on  the  forward  platform  of  the  caboose,  and  he  said  he  did 
not  hear  anything  to  indicate  that  the  brakes  were  sticking,  neither 
did  he  hear  anything  to  indicate  that  the  air  brakes  had  been  ap- 
plied by  the  engineman,  and  finally  when  the  speed  began  to  in- 
crease he  went  inside  the  caboose  and  reached  for  the  release  valve. 
Finding  no  air  at  that  point  he  went  back  to  the  forward  platform 
and  broke  the  air  hose  between  the  caboose  and  the  rear  car  and  he 
said  that  there  was  nothing  to  indicate  the  presence  of  any  air  in 
the  train  line.  He  did  not  open  the  conductor's  valve,  which  was 
located  on  the  outside  of  the  caboose,  saying  that  he  reached  for  the 
first  available  means  of  opening  the  train  line.  When  asked  to  ex- 
plain why  there  was  no  air  in  the  train  line  he  suggested  that  it 
might  have  been  due  to  the  action  of  some  one  in  closing  an  angle 
cock  or  to  the  fact  that  the  pumps  on  the  engine  might  have  been 
out  of  order.  Flagman  Strayer  further  stated  that  when  the  train 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  GY  block  station,  at  which  time  it  was  run- 
ning away,  he  had  looked  ahead  but  had  not  seen  any  fire  flying 
from  the  brake  shoes. 

Engineman  Beiter,  in  charge  of  helper  engine  4587,  stated  that 
when  he  coupled  to  the  rear  of  the  train  at  Conemaugh  the  gauge 
showed  a  brake-pipe  pressure  of  62  pounds.  The  engine  was  cut 
off  at  XY  block  station,  11  miles  west  of  Gallitzin.  for  the  purpose 
of  taking  water,  and  when  it  had  recoupled  to  the  train  the  pressure 


6  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

was  once  more  pumped  up  to  62  pounds.  He  said  that  62  pounds 
was  the  pressure  at  the  time  the  train  stopped  at  MO  block  station, 
about  2  miles  west  of  Gallitzin,  and  that  when  the  train  finally 
reached  the  summit  of  the  grade  at  Gallitzin  the  same  brake-pipe 
pressure  was  registered  and  that  he  sounded  one  blast  on  the  whistle 
as  a  stop  signal,  at  the  same  time  gradually  closing  the  throttle. 
The  speed  of  the  train  was  reduced  and  he  thought  it  was  going 
to  be  brought  to  a  stop,  but  his  statements  indicated  that  his  engine 
was  cut  off  and  that  train  VL-4  started  down  the  grade  without 
having  the  required  brake-pipe  pressure,  which  he  said  should  have 
been  between  75  and  85  pounds.  Engineman  Beiter  further  stated  that 
the  automatic  brake  had  been  used  in  making  the  various  stops  en 
route,  that  the  brakes  applied  and  released  properly,  and  that  in  each 
case  the  brake-pipe  pressure  was  pumped  up  immediately.  Fireman 
Fenwick  said  he  had  not  noticed  the  brake-pipe  pressure  until 
Engineman  Beiter  sounded  a  stop  signal,  at  which  time  the  pressure 
was  slightly  less  than  65  pounds,  and  that  he  did  not  see  any  mem- 
ber of  the  train  crew  when  he  cut  off  the  helper. 

Operator  Sease,  on  duty  at  GY  block  station,  said  train  VL— 1 
was  moving  at  a  speed  of  about  25  miles  when  the  engine  passed  that 
point.  He  did  not  see  any  fire  flying  from  the  wheels  nor  did  he  hear 
the  engineman  calling  for  hand  brakes,  but  he  said  there  were  two 
members  of  the  crew  on  top  of  the  train  setting  the  hand  brakes, 
one  of  these  men  being  located  on  about  the  fifteenth  car  from  the 
engine  while  the  other  apparently  was  about  30  or  35  cars  back 
of  the  engine.  Operator  Sease  did  not  realize  at  this  time  that  the 
train  was  beyond  control,  but  as  a  matter  of  precaution  he  notified 
the  operator  at  BO  block  station  to  be  watching  for  the  train. 

Operator  Chappell,  on  duty  at  BO  block  station,  said  he  had  in- 
tended to  detour  train  VL— 1  from  track  1  to  track  A,  and  this 
arrangement  was  not  changed.  As  the  train  went  through  the 
crossover  the  engine  seemed  to  sway  to  one  side  but  righted  itself, 
and  he  did  not  know  until  some  time  afterwards  that  any  portion  of 
the  train  had  been  derailed  at  that  point.  He  estimated  the  speed 
of  the  train  to  have  been  about  50  miles  an  hour,  and  said  that  there 
were  two  men  on  top  of  the  train  applying  hand  brakes.  Operator 
Chappell  further  stated  that  the  only  fire  he  saw  was  coming  from 
the  driving-wheel  brake  shoes  and  that  the  tires  on  the  driving 
wheels  seemed  to  be  red-hot. 

An  eyewitness  who  was  standing  at  JK  block  station  said  that 
as  the  train  approached  that  point  he  could  see  that  the  pony-truck 
wheels  were  derailed,  while  fire  was  flying  from  under  every  car 
in  the  train.  He  estimated  the  speed  of  the  train  to  have  been  about 
35  or  40  miles  an  hour. 


ACCIDENT    AT    ALTOONA,    PA.  / 

L.  F.  Axe,  assistant  foreman  car  inspector,  said  thai  as  soon  as  he 
reached  the  scene  of  the  accident,  at  about  8.15  a.  in.,  he  examined  the 
brakes  on  the  last  11)  cars  and  the  caboose  and  found  that  only  five 
of  the  brakes  were  still  holding,  the  balance  having  released.  Later 
a  terminal  test  was  made,  and  it  was  round  that  all  the  brakes  ap- 
plied properly  except  in  the  case  of  one  car  on  which  the  brakes  were 
cut  out  and  another  on  which  the  brake  was  inoperative,  on  account 
of  a  leaky  cylinder-packing  leather;  this  test  was  made  from  a  brake- 
pipe  pressure  of  70  pounds.  Car  Inspector  Brannen  stated  it  was 
about  9.30  a.  in.,  when  in  company  with  Mr.  Axe  and  one  other  em- 
ployee, a  yard  engine  was  coupled  to  the  rear  of  the  19  cars  and  ca- 
boose, the  train  line  charged  to  TO  pounds  brake-pipe  pressure,  and  a 
20-pound  reduction  made,  and  he  said  that  on  examining  these  cars 
they  found  four  on  which  the  brakes  were  not  working.  Two  of  these 
were  the  cars  previously  referred  to  by  Mr.  Axe,  the  other  two  in- 
volving release  valves  which  had  stuck  in  the  open  position.  These 
were  closed  and  the  test  was  then  repeated  and  on  this  occasion  there 
were  only  two  cars  on  which  the  brakes  did  not  apply.  These  two 
employees  were  asked  for  their  opinion  as  to  what  caused  the  train  to 
run  away,  and  Mr.  Axe  said  from  what  he  had  seen  he  judged  that 
the  train  did  not  have  sufficient  pressure  when  coming  down  the 
grade,  otherwise  there  would  have  been  air  in  the  auxiliaries  when 
they  were  examined  after  the  occurrence  of  the  accident,  while  the 
brakes  on  all  of  the  cars  which  were  not  damaged  would  have  re- 
mained applied  as  it  was,  while  the  air  was  still  applied  on  several 
of  the  cars,  yet  it  was  just  barely  holding. 

The  air-brake  test  which  was  made  of  the  19  cars  and  caboose 
which  remained  on  the  rails  after  the  occurrence  of  the  accident 
showed  that  in  addition  to  the  two  cars  on  which  the  brakes  were  in- 
operative, as  noted  by  Assistant  Foreman  Axe,  there  were  two  other 
cars  on  which  the  piston  travel  was  Sy2  inches,  one  on  which  the  pis- 
ton  travel  was  91/.  inches,  and  one  on  which  the  travel  was  lO1/^ 
inches.  It  was  also  noted  about  30  or  35  minutes  after  the  occurrence 
of  the  accident  that  there  were  only  five  cars  on  which  the  pistons 
were  out  of.  the  cylinders,  one  of  these  being  the  car  on  which  the  pis- 
ton travel  was  10y2  inches. 

Chief  Car  Inspector  Walker  said  he  understood  that  train  VL-4 
was  assembled  at  Columbus  and  relayed  at  Dennison,  Ohio,  and  again 
relayed  at  Sharpsburg,  and  that  at  the  two  stations  last  named 
the  instructions,  in  effect,  were  to  make  only  a  road  test  of  the  air 
brakes  in  the  case  of  a  relayed  train;  should  a  train  be  assembled  at 
Sharpsburg,  however,  it  would  receive  a  terminal  test.  Mr.  Walker 
also  said  that  the  air-brake  instructions  provided  that  on  starting 
down  grades  a  brake-pipe  pressure  of  at  least  85  pounds  should  be 
carried  on  the  engine,  in  the  case  of  a  light-tonnage  train,  such  as 


8  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION 

the  train  involved  in  this  accident,  and  in  case  a  train  stops  for  a 
reason  unknown  to  the  crew  the  train  is  to  remain  at  that  particular 
point  until  the  crew  is  satisfied  that  the  brakes  are  in  condition  to 
control  the  train;  after  turning  down  the  retaining  valves  and  re- 
leasing the  brakes,  the  valves  are  to  be  turned  up  again  and  the 
brake-pipe  pressure  restored  before  proceeding.  He  considered  it  to 
be  practical  for  trains  of  the  size  involved  in  this  accident  to  start 
down  the  grade  without  stopping  at  the  summit  for  a  test  either  of 
the  air  brakes  or  of  the  retaining  valves,  provided  it  is  known  that 
the  brakes  are  in  good  condition  and  also  provided  thai  the  required 
pressure  is  maintained;  in  fact,  he  state* I  that  the  only  difficulty  ex- 
perienced on  this  grade  was  due  to  trains  breaking  in  two  or  stall- 
ing due  to  the  extra  attention  paid  to  keeping  up  the  brake-pipe 
pressure  and  keeping  down  the  speed.  He  further  stated  no  re- 
taining-valve  tests  are  made  in  this  particular  territory  other  than 
to  see  that  the  pipes  are  intact  and  coupled  to  the  valves  and  that  the 
valves  appear  to  be  in  working  order. 

Assistant  Trainmaster  Gerard,  located  at  Sharpsburg,  said  that 
in  the  case  of  rela}7ed  trains  the  clerk  who  handles  the  waybills 
secures  information  as  to  the  number  of  operative  air  brakes  either 
from  the  conductor  or  the  yardmaster;  he  then  writes  down  this 
information  on  a  blank  form  and  turns  it  over,  together  with  the 
waybills,  to  the  conductor  who  is  to  have  charge  of  the  train  when  it 
leaves  Sharpsburg.  No  terminal  or  retaining- valve  tests  are  mad*1 
on  such  trains,  the  conductor  of  the  incoming  train  being  expected 
to  know  of  any  inoperative  brakes  and  to  furnish  information  con- 
cerning them.  If  there  are  any  cars  on  which  the  brakes  are  in- 
operative, it  is  provided  in  the  instructions  that  these  cars  are  to 
be  cut  out  of  the  train  and  repaired  before  being  forwarded  to  their 
destination.  In  this  connection  it  might  be  stated  that  the  car  in- 
spectors at  Sharpsburg  shopped  one  car  on  account  of  a  broken  arch 
bar  and  another  car  on  account  of  a  broken  truss  rod. 

Train  VL-4  had  been  made  up  at  Columbus,  Ohio,  on  the  after- 
noon of  November  27,  at  which  time  a  terminal  air-brake  test  was 
made  by  car  inspectors.  These  inspectors  stated  that  the  air  brakes 
on  the  train  were  in  good  condition,  with  a  piston  travel  of  between 
6  and  8  inches,  but  that  they  did  not  make  any  test  of  the  retaining 
valves  other  than  to  see  that  they  were  open.  These  inspectors  also 
stated  that  a  road  test  was  made  after  the  engine  was  coupled  to  the 
train  for  the  purpose  of  determining  that  the  air  brakes  were 
working  through  to  the  caboose.  The  terminal  test  was  completed 
at  about  5.45  p.  m.  and  the  road  test  at  about  6.20  p.  m. 

Machinist  Gilchrist,  located  af  Sharpg'buTg,  said  he  had  worked 
on  the  air  brakes  on  engine  1282  on  November  27,  prior  to  its  depar- 


ACCIDENT  AT   AI/TOONA,    PA.  9 

ture  on  train  VL-4  on  November  28.  The  reservoir  pressure  was  all 
right  but  he  changed  the  brake-pipe  pressure  Betting  from  75  pounds 
to  70  pounds.  He  said  he  had  a  report  that  the  air  gauge  registered 
improperly,  but  on  testing  it  he  found  it  to  be  only  V/2  pounds  out 
of  the  way,  and  therefore  did  not  make  any  repairs.  He  did,  how- 
ever, find  that  the  pi  (on  travel  of  the  driving-wheel  brakes  was  about 
7  inches  and  said  he  adjusted  this  travel  to  about"  5%  inches.  He 
did  not  notice  anything  wrong  with  the  operation  of  the  pump  and 
said  he  considered  the  air-brake  equipment  on  the  engine  to  be  in 
good  condition.  Examination  of  engine  1282,  which  is  of  the 
2—8-2  type,  showed  that  the  driving-wheel  tires  had  been  badly  over- 
heated, four  of  them  being  loosened.  Careful  examination  of  such 
parts  of  the  air-brake  equipment  of  the  engine  as  could  be  tested 
failed  to  develop  anything  wrong  with  the  exception  of  a  slight 
leak  to  the  atmosphere  at  the  rotary  valve  when  in  the  release  po  i- 
tion,  but  in  this  case  the  valve  handle  and  stem  bore  evidence  of 
having  been  struck  by  something  when  the  engine  was  wrecked. 
The  work  reports  show  that  considerable  trouble  had  been  experi- 
enced with  the  air  compressor  and  that  finally  on  November  24  it 
had  been  removed  and  another  compressor  applied  which  had 
oeen  previously  inspected  and  tested. 

conclusions 

This  accident  was  caused  by  failure  to  know  that  the  air-brake 
system  was  in  proper  condition  to  control  the  train  before  allowing 
it  to  proceed  from  the  point  at  which  it  had  stalled  on  a  heavy  de- 
scending grade,  for  which  Conductor  Perry  and  Engineman  Scheline 
are  primarily  responsible. 

The  investigation  developed  that  after  the  train  had  stalled,  at 
a  point  where  the  grade  was  about  1.70  per  cent  descending,  the 
only  thing  done  by  the  members  of  the  crew  was  to  endeavor  to 
release  the  brakes  so  as  to  allow  the  train  to  proceed,  no  attempt 
being  made  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  the  trouble  responsible  for  the 
stalling  of  the  train.  The  engineman  had  to  take  the  slack  several 
times  before  he  finally  succeeded  in  starting  the  train,  at  which  time 
many  of  the  brakes  still  were  sticking,  and  it  appears  that  after  the 
train  had  once  been  started  it  never  again  was  under  the  engineman's 
control.  The  reason  for  the  stalling  of  the  train  was  not  definitely 
ascertained.  However,  all  the  evidence  indicates  that  the  emergency 
application  which  stalled  the  train  was  due  either  to  imdesired  quick 
action  of  a  triple  valve  at  some  point  in  the  train  or  to  an  open  brake 
pipe  probably  caused  by  a  burst  hose.  The  theory  of  an  overcharged 
brake  pipe,  advanced  by  Brakeman  Pincuspy  and  Conductor  Perry, 
is  not  tenable. 


10  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION 

Conductor  Perry  turned  down  a  few  retaining  valves  and  bled 
a  few  auxiliaries  at  the  rear  of  the  train,  and  then  went  directly  to 
the  telephone,  from  which  point  he  proceeded  toward  the  head  end 
of  the  train  and  met  the  brakeman  at  a  point  about. 25  car  lengths 
from  the  engine.  While  Conductor  Perry  was  talking  with  the 
brakeman  at  this  point,  the  engineman  was  taking  slack  on  the  train 
in  an  effort  to  start  it,  the  brakes  still  sticking,  and  finally  got  it 
moving  while  the  conductor  and  brakeman  were  still  engaged  in 
conversation.  No  member  of  the  train  crew  had  an  opportunity  to 
know  anything  about  the  condition  of  the  train  behind  the  twenty- 
fifth  car  from  the  head  end.  After  the  train  once  started  it  was 
absolutely  beyond  control.  When  Flagman  Strayer  mounted  the 
caboose  after  being  called  in  he  did  not  notice  the  brake-pipe  pres- 
sure indication  on  the  air  gauge,  but  when  the  speed  of  the  train 
increased  unduely  he  broke  the  air  hose  between  the  caboose  and 
rear  car  and  found  no  air  in  the  brake  pipe. 

This  accident  very  forcibly  calls  attention,  not  only  to  a  woeful 
lack  of  rule  observance  on  the  part  of  the  responsible  members  of  this 
train  crew,  but  aho  to  lack  of  adequate  safeguards  by  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Railroad  Co.  to  insure  that  trains  shall  be  safely  operated  on 
this  descending  grade. 

In  the  first  place,  this  train  broke  o\\  r  the  summit  of  the  grade 
with  the  rear  end  not  charged  to  the  pressure  required  by  rule.  The 
nonchalance  with  which  this  fact  was  treated  when  attention  was 
called  to  it  by  the  designated  signal  from  the  engineman  of  the 
helper  engine  indicates  that  the  rule  is  more  honored  in  its  breach 
than  in  its  observance.  Next,  this  train  was  moved  from  Columbus, 
Ohio,  to  the  point  of  accident,  a  distance  of  approximately  300  miles, 
passing  through  two  established  terminals  at  which  the  engines  and 
crews  were  changed,  without  any  test  of  the  brakes  other  than  the 
ordinary  road  test  to  determine  that  the  brake  pipe  was  open 
throughout  the  train.  No  information  as  to  the  efficiency  of  the 
brakes  on  this  train  was  had  by  the  crew  which  took  charge  of  it 
at  Dennison  or  at  Sharpsburg,  It  was  particularly  essential  that  full 
information  about  brake  conditions  should  have  been  furnished  the 
crew  which  took  the  train  at  Sharpsburg,  the  last  terminal  passed 
before  descending  the  grade  on  which  the  accident  occurred.  The 
evidence  is  that  it  is  the  regular  practice  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road Co.  to  operate  trains  of  this  character  as  this  train  was  oper- 
ated.   This  is  a  bad  practice  which  should  be  corrected. 

The  test  which  was  made  of  the  brakes  on  the  cars  which  remained 
intact  after  the  accident  disclosed  brakes  with  unduely  long  piston 
(ravel,  and  at  least  two  that  were  wholly  inoperative.    It  is  reason- 


ACCIDENT  AT   ALTOONA,   PA.  11 

able  to  assume  that  this  was  typical  of  the  brake  conditions  on  the 
entire  train,  a  state  of  affairs  which  would  not  have  existed  had  a 
proper  brake  test  been  made  at  Sharpsburg  and  the  necessary  repairs 
made. 

It  is  a  regrettable  circumstance  that  serious  accidents  such  as  the 
one  herein  considered  often  seems  to  be  the  only  means  of  effecting 
a  correction  of  unsafe  practices  of  long  standing.  While  the  opera- 
tion of  trains  on  Gallitzin  grade  is  nominally  by  means  of  air  brakes, 
it  has  long  been  the  practice  not  only  to  permit  but  to  encourage  the 
use  of  hand  brakes  in  connection  therewith,  the  number  of  hand 
brakes  used  being  left  to  the  judgment  of  enginemen  and  conductors 
in  charge  of  trains.  The  control  of  trains  on  this  grade,  therefore, 
is  partly  by  air  brakes  and  partly  by  hand  brakes.  This  practice, 
like  all  practices  which  involve  a  division  of  responsibility,  leads 
to  a  reliance  upon  one  method  to  correct  deficiencies  in  the  other, 
leading  to  the  result  that,  sooner  or  later,  both  methods  will  inevi- 
tably fail  when  most  urgently  needed. 

The  lesson  to  be  learned  in  this  connection  is  that  if  trains  are  to 
be  controlled  by  means  of  air  brakes  they  must  be  so  controlled  ab- 
solutely and  without  reservation.  This  means  that  the  air  brakes 
must  be  maintained  in  an  efficiently  operative  condition  at  all  times, 
and  employees  must  be  properly  instructed  in  their  use.  The  con- 
verse is  true  of  the  hand-brake  ,method.  Both  methods  can  not 
safely  be  used  together:  and  in  this  connection  it  may  be  proper  to 
observe  that  the  use  of  hand  brakes  to  control  the  speed  of  trains  is 
unlawful. 

The  employees  involved  were  experienced  men.  At  the  time  of 
the  accident  they  had  been  on  duty  about  14  hours  after  about  10 
hours  off  duty,  with  the  exception  of  Head  Brakeman  Pincuspy, 
who  had  been  off  duty  about  24  hours. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

W.  P.  Borland,  Director. 


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